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Health, Wealth or Wisdom? Religion and the Paradox 
of Prosperity1
Elaine Graham
University of Manchester, UK
Abstract
Th e so-called ‘happiness hypothesis’, associated with the work of the economist 
Richard Layard, has attracted much public debate over recent years. Its main conten-
tion is that despite rising levels of material prosperity in the west, incidence of recorded 
happiness and greater quality of life has not increased accordingly. In considering the 
major contributory factors to happiness and well-being, however, Layard is not alone 
in identifying the signiﬁ cance of religious values and participation in religion for pos-
itive and enduring levels of happiness. In response, this article critiques some of the 
evidence correlating religion and well-being, as well as considering the broader and 
much more vexed question of how far public policy is capable of incorporating ques-
tions of belief and value into its indicators of happiness and the good life. Drawing on 
traditions of virtue ethics as the cultivation of ‘the life well-lived’, I ask whether spe-
ciﬁ cally Christian accounts of  human ﬂ ourishing and the good life still have any bear-
ing in the wider public domain,  and what ‘rules of engagement’ might need to be 
articulated in any dialogue between Christian values and the discourse of theology and 
a pluralist society.
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Growing prosperity since 1945 in developed economies is now being shared 
increasingly by developing economies. Yet experience and research widely rec-
ognize that above certain income levels, greater prosperity is not matched by 
greater happiness, but is accompanied instead by greater social and individual 
distress, manifested for example in increasing crime and ill-health, such as 
1) Th is article was originally delivered as the 2008 School of Th eology lecture, University of 
Auckland, New Zealand.
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depression. Much evidence now also suggests that such trends are exacerbated 
by high levels of inequality in society.
Th is so-called ‘happiness hypothesis’ is explored across a range of disciplines 
in a ﬁ eld of ‘overlapping literatures’ from the 1990s onwards.2 Th ey all con-
ﬁ rm that increasing economic prosperity in western economies is not matched 
by greater levels of recorded happiness. Th ese literatures serve as a multi-
disciplinary ‘entry-point’ for the excavation of further layers of debate about 
the relationship between global economic change, social capital, human 
behaviour and political institutions, as well as their ethical and religious 
aspects. It is notable that the various literatures on well-being are mindful of 
these latter dimensions, and increasingly are focusing on the importance of 
values and beliefs in human satisfaction or quality of life.
Alongside these developments has been the re-emergence of religion glob-
ally, including into public life, and more recently matched by the growing 
interest, especially in the west, in the religious contribution to ‘social capital’, 
or the capacity to build social networks within and across various parts of civil 
society. It is the potential link between this latter development and the grow-
ing concern over the paradox of prosperity for human well-being which forms 
the basis of this lecture, which will focus on interacting this so-called ‘happi-
ness hypothesis’ with a consideration of the potential role and contribution of 
religious values and organizations. It has further resonances with emerging 
interest in faith-based economics and ethical aspects of development, debt 
relief and poverty reduction: with the morality of the market and the question 
of values, not just in terms of informing the ‘moral compass’3 of individuals as 
they chart their course through life, but raising questions about the very pur-
poses and ends to which political economy as a whole should be directed.
If the question of happiness and well-being (especially in relation to eco-
nomic prosperity) is multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional, then the ques-
tion of religion emerges as one, not insigniﬁ cant, element of that. Given that 
such a broad-based debate opens up questions of meaning and value, this 
opens new doors for theological input, and there are signiﬁ cant overlaps 
between philosophical thinking about the good life, particularly around virtue 
2) John R. Atherton, Transcending Capitalism: An Enquiry into Religion and Global Change (Lon-
don: SCM Press, 2008).
3) See Gordon Brown, “I will not let Britain down”, Th e Guardian (25 September 2007), <http://
www.guardian.co.uk/frontpage/story/0,,2176532,00.html> [accessed 30 September 2007]; for a 
critique of the term, see Francis Davis, Elizabeth Paulhus and Andrew Bradstock, Moral, But No 
Compass: Government, Church and the Future of Welfare (London: Matthew James Publishing, 
2008), p. 13.
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ethics and moral theology. My intention in this article is to trace these conver-
gences and oﬀ er some ways forward.
Following a brief introduction to the literature on happiness and well-being, 
spearheaded by scholars such as Richard Layard, I will examine the possible 
contribution of religion, and Christian theology in particular, to the debate. I 
wish to ask what Christianity has to contribute to the current debate about 
well-being, and in particular to focus on speciﬁ c aspects of religious social 
capital and virtue ethics in terms of what they might have to say. Yet, the asso-
ciated question must also be whether such demonstrations and accounts of 
human ﬂ ourishing and the good life still have any bearing in the wider public 
domain; and what ‘rules of engagement’ might need to be articulated in any 
dialogue between religious visions of happiness, health and well-being and 
those of a pluralist society.
Th e Paradox of Prosperity
Th ere is no doubt that the past 250 years of economic growth associated with 
market capitalism and industrialism has been of great beneﬁ t to the west, 
relieving many from poverty. Yet, as John Atherton comments, ‘the price of 
that liberation, so ephocal for well-being, has been the progressive inability of 
increasing income to deliver corresponding increases in happiness. Indeed, 
some argue that these economic processes, in the form of the market economy, 
themselves generate obstacles to happiness’.4
Since 1945 western economies have become more prosperous, as measured 
by indices such as Gross Domestic Product. All the indications are that mate-
rial wealth has been matched by better quality of life, as measured by levels of 
participation in education, public health and indices of mortality and morbid-
ity. Evidence suggests that above a minimum threshold, increasing income is 
(at best) weakly correlated with greater reported levels of contentment, satis-
faction and well-being. Th e research is complex and quite contested, but there 
is signiﬁ cant convergence in this respect.5 Yet people’s sense of well-being has 
stagnated, in what we might term the ‘paradox of prosperity’.
4) Atherton, Transcending Capitalism, p. 110.
5) R. Wilkinson, Th e Impact of Inequality: How to make Sick Societies Healthier (London: 
Routledge, 2005); Richard Layard, ‘Happiness and Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profes-
sions’, Th e Economic Journal, 116 (2006), 24–33; J. Helliwell, ‘How’s Life? Combining Indi-
vidual and National Variables to Explain Subjective Well-Being’, Economic Modelling, 20 (2003), 
331–60. 
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In contemporary terms the happiness hypothesis is associated most with the 
economist Richard Layard, although he draws many of his concepts from the 
psychologist Jonathan Haidt and acknowledges that his own statistical and 
quantitative work in economics must be complemented with data from human 
psychology. Layard puts it in these stark terms: ‘Th ere is a paradox at the heart 
of our lives. Most people want more income and strive for it. Yet as western 
societies have got richer, their people have become no happier’.6
Clearly, when we ask whether a human life is happy, or people are satisﬁ ed 
with their lives, we enter a problematic area in terms of what kind of evidence 
might inform such a view. We have to ask whether we are reliant on subjective 
evidence, in which people report changing degrees of satisfaction; or whether 
it is possible to construct more objective measures that are in some way inde-
pendent of the subjects themselves.
Certainly, evidence in relation to the hypothesis that rested exclusively on 
subjective data would be vulnerable in two respects: ﬁ rst, it would depend on 
people reporting a subjective state of mind; secondly, it would rely on their 
being able to give a reliable account of comparative feelings, in terms of how 
levels of happiness have changed over time.7 But inevitably, however, any mar-
ginal increase in quality of life is likely to engender higher expectations and 
desires, with the automatic probability of their not being met.8 Or as Oﬀ er 
puts it, ‘Th e paradox of aﬄ  uence and its challenge is that the ﬂ ow of new 
rewards can undermine the capacity to enjoy them’.9 Yet one of the advantages 
of the multi-disciplinarity of the ﬁ eld is that some of the ‘softer’ evidence can 
be complemented by more objective data, such as measures of income inequal-
ity, rates of mortality, health inequality and so on.
We need to consider how measurements of the relationship between eco-
nomic growth and well-being have been approached. Emphasis on Gross 
Domestic Product by nation and per capita has obvious limitations, since it 
focuses on quantitative measures at the neglect of qualitative ones, such as 
levels of crime (or perhaps more signiﬁ cantly fear of crime) or mental health; 
neither does it embrace as an index of productivity such activities as caring for 
dependent relatives or family, or the impact on the environment of manufac-
turing and a consumer society. Other alternative indices have therefore devel-
6) Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science (London: Allen Lane, 2005), p. 3.
7) Layard, ‘Happiness and Public Policy’.
8) A. Kenny and C. Kenny, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Utility: Happiness in Philosophical and 
Economic Th ought (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2006), p. 187.
9) Avner Oﬀ er, Th e Challenge of Aﬄ  uence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and 
Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 2.
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oped: the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, which incorporates factors 
such as environmental indicators; the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme Human Development Index, which takes account of life expectancy, 
infant mortality, educational attainment, access to basic facilities—and in 
some versions, matters such as the ‘digital divide’ in terms of distribution of 
Information and Communication Technologies between and within national 
economies.10 A third system goes furthest in terms of integrating psychological 
indicators and subjective measures, which are acknowledged as external to the 
market, and reﬂ ect the importance of relationships, emotional well-being, 
social mobility and other normative factors. What also characterizes such 
studies are that they are at pains to moderate the eﬀ ects of changes over time, 
such as the distorting eﬀ ects of rising expectations; and the results of such 
surveys record remarkably consistent results over a period of more than forty 
years.11
A major feature of many advanced economies after 1945 is of course the 
increase in welfare expenditure and the concomitant eﬀ ects on quality of life, 
in terms of increased access to healthcare, pensions, unemployment and sick-
ness beneﬁ t, greater job security and fringe beneﬁ ts, not to mention the psy-
chological beneﬁ ts of freedom from anxiety about the prospect of poverty or 
destitution in old age, disability or loss of employment. Yet equally, indices of 
mental illness, addiction, crime and family breakdown have also risen, all of 
which exert a ‘steady downward pressure on the average level of happiness’.12
Some commentators note trends towards what Oliver James terms ‘selﬁ sh 
capitalism’ with growing diﬀ erentials between rich and poor, resistance to 
high taxation, privatization of utilities and less political sympathy towards 
social democratic solutions of state intervention and ﬁ scal measures of redis-
tribution (statistics for the UK suggesting that people deplore the fact that 
divisions between rich and poor are as wide as ever, but resist the idea that the 
government should intervene). In particular, Oﬀ er’s title, Th e Challenge of 
Aﬄ  uence or James’ Aﬄ  uenza, reﬂ ect the perception that prosperity has come 
to be perceived as a problem, a disease or disorder threatening social cohesion 
and inhibiting human fulﬁ lment.
A number of conclusions arise from this cumulative research. Combina-
tions of qualitative and quantitative data from economists, psychologists and 
10) Pippa Norris, Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet World-
wide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
11) Atherton, Transcending Capitalism, p. 115.
12) Layard, Happiness, p. 79.
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social statisticians have been consolidated into seven key indicators of well-
being as set out by Layard. First, family relationships: marriage and stable 
relationships contribute positively to happiness; but breakdown of key rela-
tionships has a major negative impact. Layard points to the centrality of peo-
ple’s need for love, aﬃ  rmation and mutuality in their lives. Secondly, income: 
clearly, at certain transitional points, a marginal increase engenders dispropor-
tionately positive results, in terms of a move from absolute poverty to relative 
aﬄ  uence, but data suggests it can happen equally powerfully in the other 
direction, in terms of negative impact of fall in income. Th irdly, work: not just 
as provider of ﬁ nancial security, but as source of relationships, meaning and 
self-worth. We have known since the 1930s about the psychological eﬀ ects of 
long-term unemployment, and research suggests that the loss of one’s job has 
an eﬀ ect on one’s happiness in much more than purely ﬁ nancial terms. Th e 
fourth indicator is networks of community and friends as important sources 
of good social capital. Fifthly, health, if not a major contributor to well-being 
is certainly a source of negative eﬀ ects, especially if it is a symptom of other 
forms of inequality. Th e sixth indicator is personal freedom, in terms of oppor-
tunities to participate in decision-making, to take part in community activi-
ties, and the seventh indicator is personal values and philosophy of life.
A further signiﬁ cant dimension is added by the work of Amartya Sen, who 
challenges the predominance of growth-driven models for developing econo-
mies.13 He focuses instead on developing criteria for economic growth based 
on the enhancement of human capital. Th is has lead many economists to 
question whether the market economy on its own can deliver sustained and 
comprehensive improvement in human happiness. Further intervention in 
terms of political economy may be required, and there is a vigorous debate as 
to whether measures to improve income distribution, increase equality of 
opportunity and promote civil rights are actually necessary in order to deliver 
sustained outcomes around life chances, life expectancy and quality of life.
Sen’s argument is that our overriding concern is, or should be, with human 
ﬂ ourishing, in which all, rich and poor, have a stake, and that now involves 
addressing the whole of the spectrum of inequality, since evidence suggests 
that happiness and satisfaction are aﬀ ected by people’s perceptions of their 
status relative to others, and that well-being is greater in societies with smaller 
income diﬀ erentials. Th is has led some commentators to argue for govern-
ment interventions to modify the economy, since the market alone appears 
not automatically to guarantee both growth and greater equity. Th is argument 
13) Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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has gained greater strength in terms of environmental factors in relation to 
eﬃ  ciency and sustainability. As Joseph Stiglitz argues:
In short, the debate should not be centred on whether one is in favour of growth 
or against it. Th e question should be, are there policies that can promote what 
might be called moral growth—growth that is sustainable, that increases living 
standards not just today but for future generations as well, and that leads to a 
more tolerant, open society . . . to ensure that the beneﬁ ts of growth are shared 
equitably, creating a society with more social justice and solidarity rather than one 
with deep rifts and cleavages.14
All these literatures are equally in agreement that without major reform of the 
market economy human well-being will not be achieved and certainly not in 
a sustainable way. Such reform requires, among other things, addressing eco-
nomic behaviour through a reformulated understanding of the human.
Religion and the Pursuit of Happiness
So far we have focused on the importance of ‘valuing values’ in relation to 
happiness and well-being, and the need to incorporate into economic reckon-
ings of prosperity a ‘thick’ account of human ﬂ ourishing that acknowledges 
emotional, familial and spiritual factors, and is capable of understanding how 
religious values might contribute to well-being. What the literature on well-
being acknowledges time after time is the signiﬁ cance of a philosophy of life, 
although this is not identical with organized religion—even though Layard at 
one point does indeed declare that ‘people who believe in God are happier’.15
Th e Center for Spirituality, Th eology and Health at Duke University in the 
United States publishes digests of research in this area, and reports on a series 
of clinical studies which suggest, amongst other things: improved rates of 
recovery for cancer patients who report involvement in faith communities; 
enhanced longevity amongst those who attend synagogue; slower rates of cog-
nitive decline in those experiencing the onset of dementia and marginal impact 
on aspects of coping strategies in relation to recovery from serious illness for 
14) Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Th e Ethical Economist’, Foreign Aﬀ airs (November-December 2005), <http://
www.foreignaﬀ airs.org/20051101farevieessay84612/joseph-e-stiglitz/the-ethical-economist.
html> [accessed 15 June 2008].
15) Layard, Happiness, p. 72.
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religious people.16 Th e evidence is varied, but rich, although clearly such 
research raises important questions of method and interpretation. For exam-
ple, is the incidence of better mental health amongst religious people due to 
divine inﬂ uence or human solidarity; do diﬀ erent religious traditions deliver 
diﬀ erent degrees of well-being; what about religious traditions that stress indi-
vidual practices, such as meditation, in comparison with more corporate ones; 
what is the relationship between ‘religion’ and ‘spirituality’, that is between 
organizational, formal dimensions of observance and a more subtle apprecia-
tion of existential or transcendent dimensions to life.
In terms of explaining the correlation between religion and well-being, 
however, the consensus seems to be that there is powerful ‘added value’ in 
religion.17 It appears to be down to a combination of factors, amongst which 
social support and membership of a faith-community is pre-eminent, but 
which extends to other forms of religious practice, such as prayer, reading 
one’s sacred Scriptures, a sense of meaning, an existential belief system and a 
well-articulated moral code. Whilst other (secular) activities might provide 
some of these elements, commentators such as Richard Eckersley, argue that 
religion ‘packages’ these components eﬀ ectively and accessibly.18
More speciﬁ cally, John Swinton postulates various tangible mechanisms by 
which religious aﬃ  liation might contribute to greater mental and emotional 
well-being including: regulation of lifestyle and behaviour, such as restriction 
of intake of alcohol; provision of resources, such as social support and net-
works; promotion of positive self-esteem; acquisition of speciﬁ c life-skills and 
coping resources, such as a framework of understanding illness, stress or loss; 
generation of positive emotions, cultivation of disposition towards forgive-
ness, hope and transformation.19 Eckersley states: ‘All in all, well-being comes 
from being connected and engaged, from being suspended in a web of rela-
tionships and interests. Th is gives meaning to people’s lives’.20
16) ‘Latest Religion and Health Research Outside Duke (2000–2007)’, <http://www.dukespirituality
andhealth.org/resources/pdfs/Research%20-%20latest%20outside%20Duke.pdf> [accessed 8 July 
2008].
17) Ibid.
18) Richard M. Eckersley, ‘Culture, Spirituality, Religion and Health: Looking at the Big Pic-
ture’, Medical Journal of Australia, 186:10 (suppl.), 54–6.
19) John Swinton, ‘Researching Spirituality and Mental Health’, in M. E. Coyte, P. Gilbert and 
V. Nicholls, eds, Spirituality, Values and Mental Health (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 
2007), pp. 292–305.
20) Eckersley, 54.
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Th ese claims veer towards the territory of religion as a form of ‘social capi-
tal’. Th e danger of all of this, however, is to fall into a narrowly functionalist 
account, in which religion ‘delivers’ certain social goods to wider society. Th is 
is certainly one of the ways in which the ‘social capital’ thesis can be adopted, 
but it seems to me that there are broader, critical and normative factors that 
need to be considered: perhaps more a theological critique or reﬂ ection on the 
nature of human well-being.
Social Capital, Religion and Well-Being
Th e theory of ‘social capital’ tries to understand the sources of social solidarity 
and what motivates people to participate actively in social and political net-
works, locally, nationally and globally. Th e political scientist Robert Putnam is 
credited for generating much of the current interest in the term following the 
publication of his book Bowling Alone in which he notes the decline in many 
voluntary and leisure societies in the US and contemplates the deleterious 
eﬀ ects of this on matters such as democratic participation.21 Deﬁ nitions of 
social capital vary, but it is best summarized in John Field’s simple phrase, that 
‘relationships matter’.22 He states:
By making connections with one another, and keeping them going over time, 
people are able to work together to achieve things that they either could not 
achieve by themselves, or could only achieve with great diﬃ  culty. People connect 
through a series of networks and they tend to share common values . . . To the 
extent that these networks constitute a resource, they can be seen as forming a 
kind of capital.23
Th e World Bank describes social capital as ‘the institutions, relationships and 
norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions’,24 
and Putnam highlights its purposeful or functional dimensions, in terms of 
the ‘features of social life—networks, norms, and trust—that enable partici-
pants to act together more eﬀ ectively to pursue shared objectives . . . Social 
21) Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: Th e Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2000).
22) John Field, Social Capital (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 1. 
23) Ibid.
24) Th e World Bank, ‘What is Social Capital?’, PovertyNet (1999), <http://www.worldbank.org/
poverty/scapital/whatsc.htm> [accessed 13 October 2008].
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capital, in short, refers to social connections and the attendant norms and 
trust’.25
What is interesting is how much of the social capital literature intersects 
with the literature on happiness, in terms of oﬀ ering insights into the devices 
by which individuals are able to feel a greater connection to the wider com-
munity; in other words, the very kinds of networks which seem to engender 
better quality of life. So, one policy document identiﬁ es some of the positive 
beneﬁ ts of strong social capital: high GDP; higher educational attainment; 
lower levels of crime (as a result of strong social norms and levels of trust); 
better health; more eﬀ ective institutions of democratic participation, in terms 
of linking citizens with government. If we look at those alongside Layard’s ‘big 
seven’, we see an interesting degree of correlation.
A further dimension is the signiﬁ cance of religion for engendering forms of 
social capital. Putnam has probably led the way in charting how religious val-
ues and organizations serve as rich sources of social capital, which foster pre-
cisely those networks and relationships that seem to contribute most decisively 
to healthy social networks and thus to our quality of life. As Putnam reports, 
churchgoers are ‘substantially more likely to be involved in secular organiza-
tions, to vote and participate politically in other ways and to have deeper 
informal social connections’.26 Th e distinctiveness of churchgoers’ values and 
attitudes—the theological well-spring of their motivations—is variously 
described as ‘faithful’ or ‘spiritual’ capital.27 Th e Commission on Urban Life 
and Faith use this term to describe the quantitative and qualitative eﬀ ect of 
churches on the life of their neighbourhoods. It is intended to link the sense 
of strong values that guide and inform activism.
Research from the William Temple Foundation (WTF) in Manchester dis-
tinguishes between two dimensions of religion as social capital. Religious 
capital is what religion contributes, in terms of tangible outcomes and social 
goods; ‘spiritual capital’ is, by contrast, the why of the religious contribution: 
‘the motivating basis of faith, belief and values (sometimes expressed in . . . 
worship, creedal statements and articles of faith, or more intangibly as one’s 
own ‘spirituality’) that shapes the actions of faith communities’.28
25) Putnam, Bowling Alone.
26) Ibid., p. 66.
27) Commission on Urban Life and Faith, Faithful Cities: A Call for Celebration, Vision and Justice 
(London: Methodist Publishing House, 2006). I would defend the term ‘faithful capital’ against 
its critics because of its ability to hold together in synthesis dimensions of the religious (practice-
based outcomes) and the spiritual (values or beliefs).
28) C. R. Baker and H. Skinner, Faith in Action: Th e Dynamic Connection between Spiritual and 
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Th is WTF research identiﬁ es the following seven dimensions of spiritual 
capital: emphasis on transformation, personal and corporate engagement; 
valuing personal experience and narrative around monitoring impact of social 
change, such as regeneration; belief that God is at work in social change; 
acknowledging aﬀ ective dimensions of political activism; values of vulnerabil-
ity, forgiveness, risk, learning, transformation; unconditional acceptance of 
everyone; cultivating people’s inner resources.29
If religion is one of the most potent sources of strong values and principles 
that appear to make the diﬀ erence as people steer their way through the world, 
then this is precisely because it represents a powerful synthesis of belief and 
action. We might term this ‘performative’ faithful capital: belief and practice 
are indivisible; this is encapsulated well in understandings of ‘praxis’, as value-
driven, value-directed action and in the term ‘phronesis’ or practical wisdom.
However, this only serves to highlight the question of the relationship 
between values and practices: the literature on religious/social capital, or faith-
ful capital, is increasingly converging on the impossibility of separating the 
two. It resists, therefore, a straightforwardly functionalist reading of the con-
tribution of religion to wider society whereby faith merely ‘delivers’ social 
goods and should be evaluated on its eﬃ  ciency or eﬀ ectiveness in so doing, as 
with any other organization.
As Atherton argues, this establishes a continuum between ethics and reli-
gion, or between market economics and welfare economics. It also resonates 
powerfully with other literatures on the foundations of healthy social capital, 
and especially the role of religion in nurturing bonding, bridging and linking 
the social relationships and networks that appear to be so crucial in fostering 
well-being.30
Th is takes us further into the territory of virtue ethics and teleology, because 
they form part of the realization within the happiness and well-being literature 
of the centrality of people’s goals and values. It is about being able to establish 
some basic criteria of human ﬂ ourishing—of what actually constitutes a life 
well lived—in order to be able to make some judgements about what is good 
for us. In so far as virtue ethics represents diﬀ erent accounts of the ‘good life’, 
especially in theologically-derived virtue ethics, the idea that the good is related 
to the ends for which humans are believed to have been created, occupies a 
prominent position.
Religious Capital (Manchester: William Temple Foundation, 2006), p. 9, available at <http://
www.wtf.org.uk/documents/faith-in-action.pdf>.
29) Ibid., pp. 20–21.
30) Atherton, Transcending Capitalism, p. 131.
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In Aristotle’s thought, the good life is deﬁ ned in terms of the pursuit of 
happiness, or eudaimonia. Th is entails the achievement of one’s ultimate goal, 
or telos, which is essentially about shaping one’s life according to the virtues of 
excellence, learning and pleasure. Christian theologians such as Augustine and 
Aquinas put it that in a Christian framework, in which virtue is about con-
forming to God’s purposes, a goal that can only be fulﬁ lled in the afterlife, 
adapted in later medieval times to conformity to the precepts of natural 
law. So there is an ontological as well as a moral dimension to the normative 
basis of happiness and well-being: we are most fulﬁ lled when becoming and 
attaining our highest calling and our most authentic being, which in tradi-
tional Christian theology is to become what God has created us to be, by 
practising the virtues of faith, hope, love and charity with the assistance of 
divine grace.
Eudaimonia is traditionally translated as happiness, although Elizabeth 
Anscombe prefers the term ‘ﬂ ourishing’, a concept that has recently re-entered 
moral discourse with the work of Grace Jantzen, who explicitly contrasts it 
and the world-view it embodies with the language and terminology of ‘salva-
tion’.31 Th e aim of the ‘good life’ in virtue terms for Jantzen is not to seek 
rescue from a fallen and corrupt world, but to promote the values of new life, 
creativity and justice in ways that propel us towards ‘becoming divine’.32 Other 
philosophers and theologians have emphasized the importance of moral 
agency and choice: the good is something that has to be chosen, there has to 
be an element of freedom, it is not about simply following a pre-destined life-
course, or following prescribed rules. Arguably, what makes any action moral 
is the necessity of choosing between conﬂ icting goods or even lesser evils. In 
that respect, we return to a useful strand in virtue ethics, which is about how 
one cultivates the gifts of moral discernment: seeking and attaining the good 
and our own well-being and that of the planet is not only about following a 
path, but acquiring the map-reading skills by which one navigates one’s course 
through life.
Th e life which cultivates virtue is preferable for many to alternative tradi-
tions of moral reasoning, such as Kantian deontology or utilitarian/conse-
quentialist theories. Th e alternative of ‘right action’ versus ‘good consequences’ 
31) Grace M. Jantzen, ‘Th e Gendered Politics of Flourishing and Salvation’, in Vincent Brümmer 
and Marcel Sarot, eds, Happiness, Well-Being and the Meaning of Life (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 
1996), pp. 58–75.
32) Ibid., p.6; Grace M. Jantzen, Becoming Divine: Toward a Feminist Philosophy of Religion 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998.), pp. 156–70.
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can be resolved by an emphasis on the qualities of the moral agent, but 
we cannot escape the question of what nurtures and sustains the practical 
wisdom of that moral individual; nor to consider whether in fact it is not 
about individual virtue but an ecology of virtue in which the individual’s par-
ticipation in a community’s shared ethos is what cultivates the practical wis-
dom of discernment.
Th e revival of virtue ethics in theology could usefully connect with this lit-
erature on well-being, therefore, since it oﬀ ers a way of reconciling the poten-
tial conﬂ ict between law and grace, whilst oﬀ ering such a framework into the 
public domain: a ‘more dialogic approach to Christian ethics [which] attempts 
to maintain the integrity of religious traditions, while drawing out the poten-
tial for mutual understanding between them—both within Christianity and 
between Christianity and other faith or non-faith-based groups’.33
Th is takes us into a debate about how questions of value and how notions 
of the good can be negotiated in pluralist societies, and what role is aﬀ orded 
to any religious traditions; that is, whether religion can be taken seriously as a 
well-spring of public values, or is it to be seen purely as a sectional, ﬁ duciary 
language only for the faithful.
Th e point is, religious people do have a long history of thinking about val-
ues, many of which they share across traditions and many of which have actu-
ally informed the cultural world-views in which secular people ﬁ nd themselves. 
So it is that dialectic—the sense that Christian identity, like that of other reli-
gious and cultural traditions, has always developed in particular contexts and 
through constant processes of change and revision, interacting with other 
world-views, religious and secular—that needs to be aﬃ  rmed: a convergence 
of theologically-grounded notions of virtue with those of others.
Yet equally, it may be asked whether Christians should be more wary of 
having anything to do with a concept as banal and self-seeking as ‘happiness’. 
Th e strong counter-cultural and eschatological nature of early Christianity 
would suggest that new life in Christ and the task of entering the Kingdom 
have little or nothing to do with living happily ever after, with contentment 
with one’s lot or settling for social conformity. Th e church’s memory of Jesus 
is of one who preached no cheap grace, but rather warned of the hatred, per-
secution and abuse they would encounter (Mt. 10:24–39). If this is the corpo-
rate memory of a persecuted community, then it also reﬂ ects the shared 
conviction that Christian discipleship is a process of constant struggle towards 
33) J. Garnett, M. Grimley, A. Harris, W. Whyte and S. Williams, eds, Redeﬁ ning Christian Brit-
ain: Post 1945 Perspectives (London: SCM Press, 2006), p. 201.
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the parousia that speaks of God’s radical intervention in human aﬀ airs, rather 
than the ameliorative gradualism of history, as the ultimate goal to which the 
faithful should aspire.
Th e idea is that happiness is to be found in a struggle within a world 
governed by the dynamics of tragedy rather than comedy, of suﬀ ering in the 
face of overwhelming moral complexity rather than the restoration of order 
and stability. Th is is also present in the Aristotelian teleology in which a life 
virtuously-lived is constantly tested against notions of the good and excellent 
which involve ends and values that transcend mere self-interest or subsistence. 
Yet ‘being good’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘being happy’: admit-
tedly, the Aristotelian tradition, later taken up by natural law theory, teaches 
that virtue and goodness are all about orientating ourselves towards that which 
will authentically fulﬁ l our true natures. Surely, then, we should be happy 
if we are becoming truly ourselves; but Christian theology would also teach 
that if we live in a fallen world in which the limitations and ﬂ aws of sin are an 
ever-present reality, then we can never be complacent about simply following 
our own desires.
Th is also propels us towards some of the more communitarian traditions, as 
found in the work of Stanley Hauerwas for example, in which the emphasis is 
on inhabiting the habitus of a community, which tells the stories by which the 
good life is to be guided: this again is about cultivating habits of discernment 
in the context of particular practices of virtue.34 It is through participation in 
community that we learn to consider and evaluate the lives of others; in com-
munities of faith, there is the (perhaps unique) opportunity to connect with 
the lives of those in other cultures (by virtue of the global nature of many 
faiths) as well as across many generations and historical epochs. Th is consti-
tutes a unique brand of ‘cultural capital’. We need communities as schools of 
virtue, as the places that nurture us. Th is is characteristic of Hauerwas and 
other forms of post-liberal Christian ethics. Harriet Harris states:
After all, if being trained in virtue is like learning the skills for practising a craft, 
or for making and appreciating good music or art, or becoming aware of how to 
eat healthily, then Christianity can provide teaching, practices and disciplines, 
mentors and communities in which to be so trained.35
34) Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1981).
35) Harriet Harris, ‘Ambivalence over Virtue’, in Garnett et al., eds, Redeﬁ ning Christian Britain, 
pp. 210–21 at p. 210.
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Th is is the strength of the communitarian position: we cannot be schooled in 
virtue in abstract. Th ese values have to be embodied and located, because 
essentially virtue, goodness and well-being are performative values. I want to 
argue that it is the extent to which virtue ethics is not only about a vision of 
the good, but about cultivating—embodying and practising—ways of life by 
which the good might be realized. In that respect, it does not need to be heav-
ily prescriptive or abstract but quite concrete. It is about how practices shape 
our moral selves and build lives well-lived, whether that is framed in terms of 
a telos or life-goal. Yet it also suggests that this needs to be quite a reﬂ ective 
task, in which the twin elements of the vision of the good and the enactment 
of the life well-lived need to be brought into active correlation. It suggests that 
virtue and cultivation of virtue also rest on the cultivation of what we might 
call ‘practical wisdom’—whether this is about theological reﬂ ection, or other 
kinds of moral discernment.
‘Practical wisdom’ or practical reasoning, has tended to be regarded as inferior 
to more lofty forms of knowledge, which perhaps reﬂ ects a split in the western 
intellectual tradition between ‘theory’ and ‘practice’. If the former is about 
generalizable, universalizable knowledge, which models an ideal type or repre-
sentation of the world, then the latter is the ﬁ eld of action which can certainly 
be used to test out theories or hypotheses, develop them, ﬁ nd exceptions or 
even disseminate knowledge, but it is rarely seen as the place which prompts 
research or generates theory. Hence, there is a sense that practice is the place 
of ‘application’ of theoretical constructs formulated elsewhere; it is secondary, 
inert. However, this division or conﬁ guration of ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ itself 
has a history.36
So there has been a return to Aristotle’s deﬁ nitions in the Nicomachean Eth-
ics in which he places phronesis (practical wisdom) alongside Sophia (wisdom). 
If Sophia is the ability to speculate on universal truths, then phronesis is more 
strategic, as the form of knowledge geared towards achieving speciﬁ c goods. 
But this is, for Aristotle, a reﬂ ective and deliberative skill, and not just simple 
technique. More recently, with the revival of ideas of practical wisdom, not 
least in the training of many professionals, this is strongly linked with notions 
of virtue and the good, insofar as practical wisdom is concerned with produc-
ing right action, ‘bringing about a good end for humans in general and for 
each unique individual’.37 As some voices in professional education argue, 
36) Hans-Ulrich Gumbrecht, Th e Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
37) W. Lauder, ‘Beyond Reﬂ ection: Practical Wisdom and the Practical Syllogism’, Nurse Educa-
tion Today, 14 (1994), 91–8 at 93.
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such practical wisdom may not necessarily involve rule-based or Kantian 
behaviour, but a complex interrelation of thinking and doing—or even 
being—by which implicit values guide discernment in relation to speciﬁ c con-
texts, networks or relationships. According to Lauder: ‘Th e goal is not some 
pre-determined end but is instead a result of aﬃ  rming oneself in spite of the 
events and circumstances which might prevent an individual achieving their 
potential or ﬁ nding some meaning in life-health experience’.38
As Harriet Harris argues, virtue theory always has to transform itself into 
practice, since it is concerned not with virtue in abstract but particular vir-
tues.39 Similarly, paralleling the literature on happiness and well-being, it is in 
the context of relationships, ways of life and institutions—in corporate tradi-
tions we inhabit and help to form, reﬂ exively, as they are shaping us—that the 
virtues are forged and demonstrated. She states: ‘Virtuous living is learned by 
being practised. It is nurtured . . . in the communities and institutions that 
shape our lives, especially families, schools, churches, and other religious insti-
tutions, colleges, places of work, community groups, and political and chari-
table organizations’.40
In my own research, I have argued that theology could be described as a form 
of ‘practical wisdom’.41 Out of the practical, everyday dilemmas come guiding 
principles, stories, images and values by which faithful action can be directed. 
Th e ways in which Christians choose to organize their ways of being in the 
world, of relating to one another in community, and of enacting ritual, care and 
spirituality, constitutes the language of authentic identity and represents the 
‘practical wisdom’ of the tradition.
Th is stems from a necessarily incarnational theology. It is my contention that 
the practical—the human—discloses, embodies and shows forth the theologi-
cal; for Christians, all human activities of healing, nurturing, sustaining and 
transforming are, ultimately, varieties of ‘God-talk’ in action and the place 
where God’s grace is shown forth in human relationships. Th e primary lan-
guage of theology is articulated in the practical wisdom of human care; only 
as a second stage does it ﬁ nd expression in systematic doctrinal propositions. 
It is amidst the necessarily unsystematic character of human action and relation-
ships that Christians uphold the essentially theological nature of human practical 
wisdom, informing faithful and transformative practice.
38) Ibid., 95.
39) Harris, ‘Ambivalence over Virtue’, p. 212.
40) Ibid., p. 210.
41) Elaine L. Graham, Transforming Practice: Pastoral Th eology in an Age of Uncertainty, 2nd edn 
(London: Mowbray; Eugene: Wipf & Stock, [1996] 2002).
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Th is is not unfamiliar within public theology. Heinrich Bedford-Strohm 
speaks of ‘bilingualism’; capable of giving an account of its own roots and 
sources, but capable of addressing a wider audience too.42 Yet my point is that 
such dialogue is not propositional but performative. Th is notion of the contri-
bution of theology as essentially a form of wisdom that is enacted and com-
municated in the life of its practitioners, yet accessible to a wider public not 
by virtue of its ability to understand ﬁ ner points of doctrine but by its ability 
to ‘read’ and witness the lived reality of that community: ‘By their fruits shall 
ye know them’. Such a performative theology, enacted in the practical wisdom 
of the community is weighty in terms of its value-ladenness, but tangible in 
the public nature of its demonstration.
I have been considering the extent to which Christians should be called to 
a self-contained life of virtue that rests exclusively on the narratives of faith 
and mores of the internal community, and the extent that their inherited val-
ues can overlap with those of other worldviews. Ethicists such as Hauerwas 
claim that ‘Christian social insights cannot be shared with others except with 
those who participate in the faith from which they come’.43 Th is underlies a 
principal fault-line in contemporary public theology today, namely between 
the communitarian or holiness traditions represented by thinkers such as 
Hauerwas and John Milbank versus the liberal perspectives of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Duncan Forrester and Charles Taylor. Th e reality is, people draw 
their concepts of the good life from a variety of sources, Christians being 
no exception; the point of contention is what aspects of such inﬂ uences—
Scripture, the corporate narrative of tradition, secular reason, experience—
should prove ultimately binding. Understandings of happiness are lived out 
and formed in a variety of settings; and the complexity of modern life is such 
that any mature adult will inevitably encounter a plethora of such messages in 
the course of a single day, just by watching a television soap opera, passing 
advertising billboards, reading a bedtime story to their children or listening to 
politicians, let alone reading the sacred texts of their tradition (which are not 
in themselves monolithic in their visions). Th ese are the raw materials out of 
which practical wisdom is negotiated; but ‘Christ’ and ‘culture’ are to be held 
in tension, and neither collapsed nor assimilated in the process.
William Cavanaugh provides a helpful metaphor for this when he returns 
to Augustine’s idea of the ‘city of God’ to examine how Christians are to 
42) Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, ‘Nurturing Reason: Th e Public Role of Religion in the Liberal 
State’, Ned Geref Teologiese Tydskrif, 48:1–2 (2007), 25–41.
43) Atherton, Transcending Capitalism, p. 7.
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manage the balance between religious faith and public reason, the tensions of 
discipleship and citizenship. He describes the two realms (not separate self-
contained worlds) as almost virtual spaces that overlap each other; but they are 
primarily performative spaces, in which diﬀ erent narratives (in our case narra-
tives of well-being and human fulﬁ lment) are lived out. He states:
Envisioning the two cities as performances helps us to avoid some serious prob-
lems with the way the church is imagined. Th e church as God sees it—the Body 
of Christ—is not a human institution with well-deﬁ ned boundaries, clearly dis-
tinguishable from the secular body politic. Th e church is not a polis, but a set of 
practices or performances that participate in the history of salvation that God is 
unfolding on earth . . . Th e church is not a separate enclave, but . . . it joins with 
others to perform the city of God.44
Th e church is not preaching to the world or delivering generic moral princi-
ples; it is, primarily, demonstrating its distinctive ethic within the world, cre-
ating a shared space in which some views of the good life are mutually 
discovered and celebrated, but also able to create an alternative oikumene, or 
household or political economy, in which diﬀ erent models of human ﬂ ourish-
ing and unconditional regard—an economy of grace rather than reward—can 
also be practised. Prompted by Cavanaugh’s terminology of space, perfor-
mance and boundaries, I am inclined to characterize public theology as a 
liminal discipline, which locates itself at the threshold, which encourages traf-
ﬁ c from the sanctuary into the street, fostering the secular vocation of those 
who need to be articulate in the vernaculars of production, consumption and 
citizenship as well as the dramas of grace, redemption and sacriﬁ ce.
To conclude, the happiness literature stresses the importance of values and 
plentiful, rich social capital such as networks of friends, intimacy, meaningful 
and rewarding (in all sense of the word) pursuits. It is also pointing to evi-
dence which suggests that religion and participation in organized religion is 
eﬀ ective at fostering that kind of social capital.
But whilst I have been arguing that Christianity may have some distinctive 
insights to oﬀ er, in terms of a particular practical wisdom of human ﬂ ourish-
ing, this still needs to be accountable and accessible to a wider world. Th e 
Christian theological contribution is drawn to some kind of bilingualism, or 
mediation between the many sources and visions of happiness and goodness 
44) William T. Cavanaugh, ‘From One City to Two: Christian Reimagining of Political Space’, 
Political Th eology, 7:3 (2006), 299–321 at 318.
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on oﬀ er. It is a balance of faith and reason, engagement in the world and 
immersion in tradition, but then as Kathryn Tanner claims, theology has 
always been dependent on ‘borrowed materials’.45 A high theology of creation 
and incarnation requires that it is within this world, and in the vernacular 
of human aﬀ airs, that eﬀ ective discipleship is undertaken. Th ere is a tension, 
but no ultimate contradiction, between the imperatives of ‘citizenship’ and 
‘discipleship’.
Similarly, ‘happiness’ being both of this world and beyond this world is a 
perfectly theologically orthodox perspective, given the Christian dispensation 
which acknowledges both the promise of the Kingdom in the light of the 
resurrection and the gifts of the Spirit, at the same time as knowing that such 
promises remain to be fully inaugurated this side of the eschaton.
Th is reﬂ ects a perennial tradition of living at the threshold between sacred 
and secular; the ‘now’ and the ‘not yet’ and between the gospel of ‘common 
grace’ and metanoia.46 Th is may permit us to conceive of overlap, if not con-
vergence, of many worldviews and value-commitments, in order that Chris-
tians can occupy the same space as others without compromising a theologically 
robust vision. If Christian faith and practice has anything to teach the world 
about happiness and the life well-lived, such wealth and wisdom must be 
oﬀ ered in the name of a common humanity and a shared concern for its ﬂ our-
ishing. For the time being, any ﬁ rm conclusions remain provisional.
In the words of the Sri Lankan theologian Wesley Ariarajah, ‘At the global 
level, there is an increasing recognition that the world’s problems are not 
Christian problems requiring Christian answers, but human problems that 
must be addressed together by all human beings’.47
45) Kathryn Tanner, Th eories of Culture: A New Agenda for Th eology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1997), pp. 61–92.
46) Elaine L. Graham, Heather Walton and Frances Ward, Th eological Reﬂ ection: Methods (Lon-
don: SCM Press, 2005), pp. 138–69.
47) S. Wesley Ariarajah, ‘Wider Ecumenism: A Th reat or a Promise?’, Th e Ecumenical Review, 
50 (1998), as cited by Ninan Koshy, ‘On the Meaning of ‘Ecumenical’’, in J. de Santa Ana, 
ed., Beyond Idealism: A Way Ahead for Ecumenical Social Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 
pp. 30–55 at p. 55.
